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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

SUMMARY

This matter arises out of a dispute regarding the existence of an access easement.
Respondents Thomas H. Ulrich and Mary M. Ulrich, husband and wife, (collectively
hereinafter "Ulrichs") own an approximately 40 acre square parcel of property located in
Teton County, Idaho. 1 Appellant John N. Bach (hereinafter "Bach") claims some right, title
and interest in the 40 acres located immediately to the south of the Ulrich Property
(hereinafter the "Bach Property"). Pursuant to Ulrichs' deed to the Ulrich Property, and the
deed to the Bach Property, Ulrichs have an access easement which provides access to the
Ulrich Property from the south, and which traverses the western boundary of the Bach
property (hereinafter the "Ulrich Property Easement"). When Ulrichs sought to improve the
Ulrich Property Easement to develop the Ulrich Property, Bach asserted that Ulrichs had no
easement and would not allow Ulrichs access to the Ulrich Property Easement.
Consequently, Ulrichs were forced to file suit against Bach for an injunction to prevent him
from interfering with Ulrichs' use of the Ulrich Property Easement and to quiet title to the

1

Ulrichs own an approximately 10 acre parcel in their own names (hereinafter the
"Ulrich Property"). Ulrichs bought the remaining 30 acres through the Bank of Commerce
IRA Fund #8768 for the Benefit of Thomas H. Ulrich IRA (hereinafter the "IRA Property").
Pursuant to their deeds, the Ulrichs Property and the IRA Property are required to be
purchase together. Both the Ulrich Property and the IRA Property contain a grant of
easement which traverses the Western boundaryoftheBachProperty. (SeeR. Vol. I, p. 13031 and 135-42).
2
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Ulrich Property Easement. Bach answered and filed a counterclaim against Ulrichs. Ulrichs
were granted summary judgment on all claims by the District Court and were awarded
attorneys fees and costs against Bach as the prevailing party. Bach now appeals the District
Court's decision. Ulrichs seek to have the District Court's decision upheld.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

B.

Ulrichs purchased the Ulrich Property in December 1996. At the time of purchase,
the Ulrich Property was conveyed to Ulrichs by Warranty Deed from Philip J. Sarasqueta &
Marilyn R. Sarasqueta, husband and wife, and Louisa S. Sarasqueta, Trustee of the
SarasquetaLivingTrust, dated October 30, 1990. (SeeR. Vol. I, p. 135-37). Such Warranty
Deed gave Ulrichs fee simple title to the Ulrich Property. The Warranty Deed contains an
express grant of easement providing access to the Ulrich Property, defined above as the
Ulrich Property Easement, as follows:
TOGETHER WITH a 60 foot road and utility easement being
the 60 feet directly East of the following described lines:
Beginning at a point North 89°50'12" West, 12.13 feet from the
South Y4 Comer of said Section 6; thence North 00°07'58" East
813.70 feet to a point; thence North 01 °37'48" East, 505.18 feet
to the SW property comer.
(R. Vol. I, p. 135-37). Access to the Ulrich Property was also guaranteed via a policy of title
insurance. (SeeR. Vol. I, p. 143-47). The Ulrich Property Easement traverses the western
boundary of the Bach Property. Additionally, the Ulrich Property Easement is reserved in
the Corporation Warranty Deed granting title to Bach's predecessors-in-interest as follows:
3
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SUBJECT TO a 60 foot road and utility easement along the Western Property
lines.

(SeeR. Vol. I, p. 162-64). ThroughoutthetimethatUlrichs have owned the Ulrich Property,
Ulrichs never demonstrated any intent to abandon the Ulrich Property Easement. (R. Vol.
I, p. 132). Additionally, until late June, 2009, Bach permitted Ulrichs to access their property
by traversing the Bach Property, albeit not via the Ulrich Property Easement, but via
alternative routes. (R. Vol. I, p. 132).
In 2010, Ulrichs decided to develop the Ulrich Property and improve the Ulrich
Property Easement by grading and paving the Ulrich Property Easement. (R. Vol. I, p. 6).
On April 24, 2010, Respondent Thomas H. Ulrich telephoned Bach to inform him that
surveyors would be present on the Ulrich Property Easement to survey the easement to
prepare for the improvements. (R. Vol. I, p. 6). At such time, Bach repeatedly insisted that
Ulrichs had no easement and threatened Respondent Thomas H. Ulrich that if surveyors
entered onto the easement, he would call the sheriffs office and have the surveyors charged
with trespass. (R. Vol. I, p. 6). Such insistence and threats by Bach prompted the filing of
suit to enjoin Bach from interfering with Ulrichs' use of the Ulrich Property Easement and
to quiet title in the Ulrich Property Easement in favor ofUlrichs. Bach filed a counter-claim
against Ulrichs for causes of action which were not entirely clear, but appeared to include
claims for fraud, deception, conversion and trespass, quiet title, breach of the implied

4
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and intentional interference with prospective and
economic relations. (R. Vol. I, p. 105-15).
On September 9, 2010, Ulrichs filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, requesting
that the District Court permit the survey of the Ulrich Property Easement and to enjoin Bach
from interfering in any way with such survey or removing any survey markers. (R. Vol. I,
p. 20-22). On October 29, 2010, the District Court entered an Order granting Ulrichs'
Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (R. Vol. I., p. 100-04). The survey of the Ulrich Property
Easement was subsequently completed. On March 10, 20 11, Ulrichs moved for summary
judgment on all remaining issues regarding their rights and interest in the Ulrich Property
Easement, as well as any and all counterclaims brought by Bach. (R. Vol. I., p. 125-28). In
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, Ulrichs relied upon the Verified Complaint
filed in this matter (R. Vol. I, p. 1-14) and the Affidavit of Thomas H. Ulrich in Support of
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. I, p. 129-64). In support of his opposition to
Ulrichs' Motion for Summary Judgment, Bach filed his own affidavit. (R. Vol. I, p. 168-89).
The District Court granted Ulrichs' Motion for Summary Judgment, found Ulrichs were the
prevailing party, and granted Ulrichs attorneys fees and costs. (R. Vol. II p. 197-228 and
254-73).

5
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Respondent includes the following additional issue on appeal:
( 1)

Whether Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal.

III. REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL
Respondent requests an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal, pursuant to
Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, and Idaho Code § 12-121, as further explained
and supported in Respondent's Argument section below.

IV. ARGUMENT
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Bach appeals the District Court's grant of summary judgment to Ulrichs as well as the

District Court's award of attorneys fees and costs to Ulrichs. When reviewing an order for
summary judgment, this Court applies the same standard of review that was used by the
District Court in ruling on the motion for summary judgment. Cristo Viene Pentecostal

Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 307, 160 PJd 743,746 (2007). Summary judgment is proper
ifthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c). If there is no genuine issue of
material fact, only a question of law remains, over which this Court exercises free review.

6
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Cristo, 144 Idaho at 307, 160 P.3d at 746 (quotinglnfanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45,
47, 44 P.3d 1100, 1102 (2002)).
This Court's standard of review regarding the award of attorneys fees and costs will
be discussed below in Section IV.H.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER BACH
Bach raises as an error on appeal the District Court's lack ofpersonal jurisdiction over

him. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 5 and 21). Bach appears to argue the District Court lacked
personal jurisdiction based upon an unidentified defect in personal service.
Such an argument has no basis. Bach acknowledges in his own brief that he was
personally served by the District Court bailiff at a hearing in this matter on September 17,
2010. (See Appellant's Brief, p. 6). Both Respondent's counsel and Judge Moeller, who was
presiding at the time, were present when Bach was served, and service of the complaint and
summons is noted in the Court's minutes from hearing on September 17, 2010. (R. Vol. I,
p. 24-25). Further, as the District Court noted in its Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiff's
Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for
Summary Judgment, Motion for a More Definite Statement, and Motion for Sanctions, Costs
and Fees, as evidenced by the Affidavit of Service, "Lindsay Moss [the District Court bailiff]
personally served Bach with the Complaint and summons, along with the Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and notice of hearing." (R. Vol. I, p. 59).

7
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Bach cites no authority which supports his argument that the personal service in this
case was somehow insufficient under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.

Bach cites

Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,201 P.3d 647 (2009) in support ofhis position. However,
Herrera pertains to defective service by publication, not personal service. See id. Bach also
cites to Marco Distributing, Inc. v. Biehl, 97 Idaho 853, 555 P.2d 393 (1976), in support of
his argument. Biehl likewise does not support Bach's position, as it addressed Idaho courts'
jurisdiction over a defendant who was a resident of another state. See id. Finally, Bach
asserts that Lawrence Wholesale Co. v. Rudio Lumber Co., 89 Idaho 389, 405 P.2d 634
(1965) supports his claim that service was defective, based upon a constitutional violation.
Lawrence Wholesale has no applicability to the case at hand because it addresses the granting
of a preliminary injunction without providing the defendant a chance to be heard. That was
clearly not the case in the matter at hand, as the District Court held a preliminary injunction
hearing at which Bach appeared, presented evidence, and argued. (See R. Vol. I, p. 3 5-46).
None of Bach's arguments support the contention that the personal service of the complaint
and summons upon him was in some way defective.
As the Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "personal service of a defendant within the
borders of his state of residence is always sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a court of
that state." Jonasson v. Gibson, 108 Idaho 459, 462, 700 P .2d 81, 84 (Ct. App. 1985). Bach

8

-

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

was clearly personally served, and there is not doubt he resides in Idaho. Consequently,
Bach's assertion that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over him is meritless.

C.

THE DISTRICT COURT HAD SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
THIS CASE AND ULRICHS DID NOT FAIL TO JOIN INDISPENSABLE
PARTIES
Bach argues that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 21-26). Bach appears to argue that the Court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction for an alleged failure on the part of Respondents to join indispensable parties.
Bach's argument is confusing at best, and does not appear to actually relate to subject matter
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, Respondent will attempt to address Bach's argument.
Bach's argument regarding indispensable parties and the joint venture is not supported
by Idaho law. The cases cited by Bach pertain not to indispensable parties to a suit, but to
the rights of joint venturers as between each other and to joint venture liability. See, i.e.,
Forbes v. Butler, 242 P. 950 (Utah 1925); Boydv. Head, 92 Idaho 389,443 P.2d 473 (1968);
Clawson v. General Ins. Co. ofAmerica, 90 Idaho 424, 412 P.2d 597 (1966); and Easter v.
McNabb, 97 Idaho 180, 541 P .2d 604 (1975). Additionally, Bach cites to Legg v. Barinaga,

92 Idaho 225, 440 P.2d 345 (1968), stating that "a partnership and individual members
thereof were ordered to be made parties defendant to the action originally commenced
against one member of the joint venture and no summons was ever served on any of the
added parties or upon the partnership; a valid judgment could not be rendered against the

9
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partnership nor against any individual partner." (Appellant's Brief, p. 23). Legg addresses
a plaintiffs attempt to enjoin a partnership from taking an action when only one member of
the partnership was served with the complaint and summons, and was served only
individually. See Legg, 92 Idaho at 227-28, 440 P.2d at 347. Legg is simply not applicable
here, as Ulrichs are not concerned with the action of any purported owner of the Bach
Property except for Bach.
Ulrichs have not failed to join any indispensable parties. Ulrichs have not sought to
quiet title or requested a declaratory judgment and injunction against any party except any
alleged interest Bach may have in the Ulrich Property Easement. Rule 19(a)(l) ofthe Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, "[a] person who is subject to service of process shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the
subject of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's
absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that
interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed
interest." Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a)(l).
As this Court has stated, 'joinder of all parties with an interest in the subject matter
of the suit is not required; rather, only those who have an interest in the object of the suit

10
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should be joined." Tower Asset Sub Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,714, 152 P.3d 581, 585
(2007); see also Pro Indiviso, Inc. v. Mid-Mile Holding Trust, 131 Idaho 741, 963 P .2d 1178
( 1998). In the current case, no other party, aside from Bach, has indicated any intent to
interfere with Ulrichs' interest in the Ulrich Property Easement. Further, the disposition of
this matter in the absence of parties other than Bach does not impair or impede the other
parties' ability to protect their interests or leave them subject to a substantial risk of incurring
double, multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations. Although the other property owners
of the Bach Property may have an interest in the subject matter of the suit as property
owners, only Bach has attempted to interfere with Ulrichs' interest in the property.
Consequently, the other property owners do not have an interest in the object of the suit.
Therefore, the other owners of the Bach Property are not indispensable parties. It is
unnecessary to join any other party in this suit, and the District Court did not err in finding
the other title owners of the Bach property were not indispensable parties. (SeeR. Vol. II, p.
210-15).

D.

THE PROPER REMEDY IN THIS MATTER IS QUIET TITLE OR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT
Bach asserts that the District Court's award of summary judgment to Ulrichs was in

error because there were "legal remedies which were available, adequate and immediate."
(Appellants' Brief, p. 24 ). Although Bach states that he "will not tell nor state for
respondent's benefit and use what legal remedies or even equitable remedies might be
11
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available," (Appellant's Brief, p. 29) as the District Court noted in its Order Granting
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, it is Bach's burden to demonstrate that Ulrichs
have an adequate, alternative remedy at law. (R. Vol. II, p. 208-1 0). As he did at the District
Court level, Bach again raises Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Quality Design Systems, Inc.,
134 Idaho 357,65 P.3d, 509,514 (2003) in support ofhis argument that Ulrichs have some
other sufficient remedy at law. Iron Eagle is not applicable here. As the District Court
explained in its Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment:
Iron Eagle involved a breach of a "build to suit" lease agreement. The
Plaintiffs, Iron Eagle and Heartland, sued the defendant, Quality Design, for
breach of contract, breach of intended third-party beneficiary contract, and
equitable claims including unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, implied
contract, quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel. The Idaho Supreme Court
ruled the parties' express contract precluded Plaintiffs from obtaining
equitable remedies against Quality Design.
Iron Eagle is inapposite to the lawsuit at bar. No express contract
between Bach and Ulrichs exists. Given the nature of the Ulrichs' requested
relief and the paucity of an adequate and complete legal remedy for the
Ulrichs' claim to use of the Ulrich Property Easement, Bach bears the burden
to come forward with a legal theory upon which his "adequate remedy at law"
defenses rests. Having failed to raise any such legal theory, Bach's "adequate
remedy at law" theory likewise fails.

(R. Vol. II, p. 209-1 0). Likewise, the other authority cited by Bach has no applicability to the
case at hand because those cases pertain to situations in which a contract between the parties
was involved or deal with issues not present here. See, i.e., Suchan v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho
288, 295, 410 p.2d 434, 428 (1966) (in which the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the

12
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general principle that "a specific tract [of land] is unique and impossible of duplication by
the use of any amount of money" but ultimately did not require specific performances of a
purchase and sale agreement based upon the particular facts of that case); Watkin v. Paul,
511 P .2d 781 (Idaho 1973) (in which the Idaho Supreme Court found money damages were
sufficient in a breach of contract case for the sale of real property where the purchasers were
not using the land in question for any specific purpose and sought the land only to resell it
for profit); and Gardner v. Fliegal, 92 Idaho 767, 450 P.2d 990 (1969) (Gardner is
completely unrelated to the issue of any "adequate remedy at law" or any issues in this case
and deals with ambiguous wording of a deed). In this matter, there is no "adequate remedy
at law." The only sufficient remedy for Ulrichs in this matter was to obtain an injunction
against Bach and to quiet title to the Ulrich Property Easement. Therefore, the District
Court's Order finding Ulrichs' interest in the Ulrich Easement is superior to Bach's was not
m error.

E.

BACH'S ARGUMENTS REGARDING PAROL EVIDENCE AND THE
DOCTRINE OF MERGER ARE NONSENSICAL AND SUCH DOCTRINES
HAVE NO APPLICABILITY TO THIS CASE
Bach appears to argue that the parol evidence rule bars the Ulrichs' claim. (See

Appellant's Brief, p. 27). This Court has stated, "[t]he 'parol evidence rule' provides that
when a contract has been reduced to a writing that the parties intend to be a final statement,
evidence of any prior or contemporaneous agreements or understandings which relate to the

13
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same subject matter is not admissible to vary, contradict or enlarge the terms of the written
contract." Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 828, 11 P.3d 20, 24 (2000) (citing Tusch
Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 44,740 P.2d 1022, 1029 (1987) and Chapman v. Haney
Seed Co., Inc., 102 Idaho 26,624 P.2d 409 (1981)). Ulrichs are unsure why Bach is raising

the parol evidence rule when the Ulrich Property Easement was created by express grant in
the Bach Deed, the Ulrich Deeds, and the deed to Ulrichs' predecessors in interest. The
District Court thoroughly analyzed this issue in its Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment:
The Ulrichs have shown their title to an express easement (the
Easement) over the westerly boundary of the Bach Property described as
follows:
... the 60 feet directly East of the following described lines:
Beginning at a point North 89 degrees 50' 12" West, 12.13 feet
from the South Y4 corner of said Section 6; thence North 00
degrees 07' 58" East, 813.70 feet to a point, thence North 01
degrees 37' 48" East, 505.18 feet to a point thence North 00
degree 04' 52" East, 659.35 feet to the SW property comer.
Precisely the same easement is reserved to the IRA Property. In
addition, the Bach Property deed reserves "a 60 foot road and utility easement
along the Western Property lines." The plain and unambiguous language
within three different property deeds establishes, as a matter oflaw the Ulrichs
own an easement over the western-most sixty feet along the western boundary
of the Bach Property.
(R. Vol. II, p. 214-15). Because parol evidence had nothing to do with the creation of the
express grant of easement in this case, such arguments by Bach should be disregarded.

14
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Further, Bach makes a nonsensical argument regarding the doctrine of merger, which
has no applicability in this case. Bach, relying on Nevada case law, states "[W]here a party
argued title to both the servient and dominant tenements, the easement merges into the fee
of the servient tenement." (Appellant's Brief, p. 27). Bach then continues, "[t]he Doctrine
of Merger of both the servient and dominant tenements occurred on June 9, 1994 when
appellant along with his original joint venturers were granted by Teton West Corporation's
Warranty Deed to the Peacock 40 acres Parcel." (Appellant's Brief, p. 27).
Bach either refuses to acknowledge or does not understand that when Teton West
Corporation divided its property into smaller parcels including the Ulrich Property and the
Bach Property, Teton West Corporation created the Ulrich Property Easement, thereby
creating a servient tenement (the Bach Property) and dominant tenement (the Ulrich
Property). Title to the Ulrich Property and Bach Property has been held by separate parties
since the time the Ulrich Property Easement was created. Consequently, the doctrine of
merger has no applicability here and Bach's arguments related to the doctrine of merger
should be disregarded.

F.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ULRICHS
HAVE RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST IN THE ULRICH PROPERTY
EASEMENT THROUGH AN EXPRESS EASEMENT.
Ulrichs have right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property Easement through an

express grant of easement. "One who purchases land expressly subject to an easement or
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with notice, actual or constructive, that is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land
subject to the easement." Akers v. D.L. White Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d
196, 204 (2005). (citing Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587
(1944)); see also I.C. § 55-603. "An express easement may be by way or reservation or
exception." !d. (citing 7 THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, THOMAS EDITION§ 60.03(a)(2)(1)
(David A. Thomas ed., 1994). "An express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor
some new right in the property being conveyed; an express easement by exception operates
by withholding title to a portion of the conveyed property." !d.
"An express easement may be created by a written agreement between the owner of
the dominant estate and the owner of the servient estate. It may also be created by a deed
from the owner of the servient estate to the owner of the dominant estate." Tower Asset Sub

Inc. v. Lawrence, 143 Idaho 710,714, 152 P.3d 581, 585 (2007). "Where the owner ofthe
dominant estate is selling the property to be subjected to the servitude, an express easement
may be created by reservation or exception." !d., 143 Idaho at 714-15, 152 P.3d 585-86
(citing Akers v. D.L. White Canst., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 PJd 196,204 (2005)). "No
particular forms or words of art are necessary [to create an express easement]; it is necessary
only that the parties make clear their intention to establish a servitude." Seccombe v. Weeks,
115 Idaho 433, 436, 767 P.2d 276, 279 (Ct. App. 1989)(disapproved of on other grounds,

Rodrigeuz v. Oakley Valley Stone, Inc., 120 Idaho 370, 378, 816 P.2d 326, 334 (1991)).
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Teton West Corporation originally owned both the Ulrich Property and the Bach
Property. (R. Vol. I, p. 130-31, 135-37, 157-60, and 162-64). When Teton West Corporation
divided up the original property into what is now the Ulrich Property and the Bach Property,
it expressly reserved the Ulrich Property Easement in the deed to the Bach Property and
granted the Ulrich Property Easement in the deed to the Ulrich Property. (SeeR. Vol. I, p.
160 and 164). Because the Ulrich Property Easement is an express easement, Ulrichs were
entitled to an order and judgment quieting right, title and interest in the Ulrich Property
Easement in their favor. Consequently, the District Court did not err in quieting title to the
Ulrich Property Easement in Ulrichs' favor.

G.

KOLOUCH V. KRAMER IS DISPOSITIVE OF THE
ABANDONMENT AND ADVERSE POSSESSION

1.

ISSUES

OF

Ulrichs Have Not Abandoned The Ulrich Property Easement.

As the District Court noted in its Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and its Order Denying Defendant John Bach's Rule 59 and 60 Motion and
Granting in Part Plaintiffs' Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs (R. Vol. II, p. 268),
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65, 813 P.2d 876 (1991), is directly on point regarding the

issues of abandonment and adverse possession of the Ulrich Property Easement. The facts
of Kolouch are nearly identical to the facts of the case at hand. In Kolouch, the Kolouchs
owned a parcel of property. The deed to Kolouchs granted them an access easement over
property owned by Kramer. !d., 120 Idaho at 67, 813 P.2d at 878. When Kramer acquired
17
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the subject property, there was a utility pole, a board fence, and some trees in the easement
area. !d. Subsequently, Kramer planted six spruce trees down the center of the easement,
planted other trees within the easement, constructed a fence inside the northerly boundary of
the easement, and a concrete irrigation diversion at the end of the easement. !d. Kramer also
placed several large boulders at the east end of the easement. !d. Years later, Kolouch
decided to develop the property and to pave an access road over the easement in order to
service the property. !d. In pursuit of that goal, Kolouchs filed a complaint for declaratory
relief requesting a declaration that they were the owners of the easement over the Kramer
property, and further declaring that they were entitled to use the described easement for
ingress and egress and for whatever further relief as the court deemed proper. !d.
The rule is well settled that mere non-use of an easement by grant does not affect an
abandonment of the easement. !d. As this Court noted in Kolouch:
[T]he present case involves an easement by written grant which has not been
used by the Kolouchs (owners of the easement) since its creation. It was not
until sometime around June of 1989 that the Kolouchs decided to use the
easement by developing a road thereon for commercial purposes. That desire
prompted their filing of the complaint for declaratory relief. Under the holding
in Quinn v. Stone, supra, it is clear that no abandonment has taken place, as
mere non-use is insufficient to work an abandonment.

!d. Likewise, in the current case, Ulrichs have an easement by written grant which has not
previously been used by Ulrichs. It was not until some years after Ulrichs purchased the
Ulrich Property that they decided to use the easement by developing a road thereon for
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ingress to and egress from their property. Prior to that time, Bach permitted Ulrichs to access
the Ulrich Property using alternative routes over the Bach Property. (R. Vol. 1., p. 132). The
Ulrichs' non-use of the easement during the interim did not constitute an abandonment of the
Ulrich Property Easement.
Further, "an abandonment of any right is dependent upon an intention to abandon and
must be evidenced by a clear, unequivocal, and decisive act of the party." O'Brien v. Best,
68 Idaho 348,357, 194 P.2d 608,613 (1948). "[I]trequires very convincing and satisfactory
proofs to support a forfeiture by abandonment of a real property right." Id. "[T]he acts
claimed to constitute the abandonment of an easement must show the destruction thereof, or
that its legitimate use has been rendered impossible by the owner thereof, or some other
unequivocal act showing intention to permanently abandon and give up the easement." !d.,
68 Idaho at 357-58, 194 P.2d at 613-614. Ulrichs have engaged in no such action. (R. Vol.

I., p. 132). Consequently, pursuant to Kolouch and O'Brien, the Ulrich Property Easement
has not been abandoned.

2.

Bach Has Not Adversely Possessed The Ulrich Property Easement.

Bach did not adversely possess the Ulrich Property Easement. "Where the defense
to the claim is adverse possession, the party asserting such defense must prove by clear and
satisfactory evidence that he or she has been in exclusive possession of the property for at
least [20] years and that the possession has been actual, open, visible, notorious, continuous,
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and hostile to the party against whom the claim of adverse possession is made." Kolouch v.

Kramer, 120 Idaho67, 67-68,813 P.2d 878,879,878-79 (1991) (internal citations omitted).
Since the owner of the servient estate owns the underlying fee, and has the right to use his
entire land for any purposes not inconsistent with the rights of the holder of the dominant
easement, the use by the servient estate must be truly inconsistent. ld, 120 Idaho at 68, 813
P .2d at 879. In Kolouch, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the holding in Castle Associates

v. Schwartz, 407 N.Y.S.2d 717, 63 A.D.2d 481 (1978), regarding the rule which covers
situations where, as in Kolouch and the case at hand, the owner of the dominant estate had
not had occasion to use the easement. This Court quoted Castle Associates as follows:
[W]here an easement has been created but no occasion has arisen for its use,
the owner of the servient tenement may fence his land and such use will not be
deemed adverse to the existence of the easement until such time as (1) the need
for the right of way arises, (2) a demand is made by the owner ofthe dominant
tenement that the easement be opened and (3) the owner of the servient
tenement refuses to do so.

Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 68, 813 P.2d at 879 (citing Castle Associates,407 N.Y.S.2d at 723,63
A.D.2d at 487). This Court further stated:
Applied here, we may paraphrase this rule to read that where the easement was
created, but no occasion has arisen for its use, the owner of the servient
tenement may plant trees, erect a fence, etc. and such use will not be deemed
to be adverse (or inconsistent, to use Shelton's term), until the need to use the
easement arises, etc. We think this rule makes sense in light of the well
established rule that the owner of the servient estate is entitled to use his land,
even though encumbered by an easement, for any purpose not inconsistent
with the purpose reserved in the easement. Accordingly, Kramer's use of his
property, which was subject to the easement has not been adverse or
20
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inconsistent with the Kolouchs' rights prior to the time the Kolouchs' need to
use the easement arose, and the trial court's finding to that effect was not
clearly erroneous.
Kolouch, 120 Idaho at 68-69, 813 P.2d at 879-80. Likewise, Bach's use ofhis property,

which was subject to the Ulrich Property Easement, has not been adverse or inconsistent with
the Ulrichs' rights because Ulrichs have not previously had a need to use the Ulrich Property
Easement. (R. Vol. 1., p. 13 2). Therefore, Bach did not adversely possess the Ulrich Property
Easement.
H.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL RAISED BY BACH

Bach does not raise arguments as to all of his issues on appeal in his Appellant's
Brief. As to the issues he does not address in his brief, Bach states, "[t]he remaining ISSUES
Number 3 and 4, supra, are not withdrawn nor waived or abandoned, as both the health of
appellant and his physicall [sic] proclivities have precluded him, from competing [sic] his
arguemtsnand [sic] analysis of citations, cases and statutes, etc." (Appellant's Brief, p. 33).
Because Bach has not raised arguments as to these remaining issues, it is impossible for
Ulrichs to address them. However, Ulrichs refer the Court to the opinions and decisions of
District Judge Darren B. Simpson regarding the arguments Bach raised below which have
not been addressed in his Appellant's Brief, and the District Court's disposition of those
arguments. (See Memorandum Decision Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction
and Denying Bach's Motion to Dismiss, Motion for Summary Judgment, Motion for More
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Definite Statement, and Motion for Sanctions, Costs and Fees (R. Vol. I, p. 47-99); Order
Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. II, p. 197-223); and Order
Denying Defendant John Bach's Rule 59 and 60 Motion, and Granting in Part Plaintiff's
Request for Attorney Fees and Costs (R. Vol. II, p. 254-273).

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AWARDED ULRICHS ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS AGAINST APPELLANT

1.

Standard of Review

This Court has set forth the standard of review regarding the prevailing party analysis
and determination of attorney's fees as follows:
The determination of who is a prevailing party, for the purpose of receiving an
award of attorney fees, is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Deckerv. Homeguard Systems, 105 Idaho 158,666 P.2d 1169 (Ct.App.1983).
That determination will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of
discretion. McCann v. McCann, 138 Idaho 228, 61 P.3d 585 (2002). To
review an exercise of discretion, this Court applies a three-factor test. The
three factors are: ( 1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the boundaries of this
discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by
an exercise of reason. Baxterv. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 169, 16 P.3d 263,266
(2000) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)).
Israel v. Leach man, 139 Idaho 24, 26, 72 P.3d 864, 866 (2003). Based on the District
Court's careful analysis, Appellant cannot establish the District Court abused its discretion
in determining Ulrichs were the prevailing party or in awarding Ulrichs attorney's fees and
costs against Bach.
22
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2.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Awarding a
Reasonable Amount of Attorney's Fees to Ulrichs

Bach states, without providing argument, that the District Court's award of attorney's
fees to Ulrichs should be overturned. (Appellant's Brief, p. 33). Bach has no basis for making
this request. There is no doubt that Ulrichs were the prevailing party in this matter. Rule
54(d)(l)(B) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
(B) Prevailing Party. In determining which party to an action is
a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial court shall in its
sound discretion consider the final judgment or the result of the
action in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties.
The trial court in its sound discretion may determine that a party
to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in part, and
upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the
parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of the
issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant
judgment or judgments obtained.
The Idaho Supreme Court has identified three areas of inquiry that a court should
consider when deciding whether a party "prevailed."
(a) the final judgment or result obtained in the action in relation
to the relief sought by the respective parties; (b) whether there
were multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (c) the
extent to which each of the parties prevailed on each of the
issues or claims. If the court determines that a party prevailed
only in part, it may apportion the costs and attorney fees among
the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of
the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant
judgment or judgments obtained.

Chadderdon v. King, 104 Idaho 406, 411, 659 P.2d 160, 165 (Ct. App. 1983).
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In this case, Ulrichs prevailed completely against Bach, both as to the reliefUlrichs
requested in their complaint and as against Bach's counterclaims. (See Order Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. Vol. II, p. 197-223)). Consequently, Ulrichs
were the prevailing party.
Further, Ulrichs were properly awarded attorney's fees and costs in this matter as the
prevailing party, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 10-1210, § 6-402 and§ 12-121. "An award of
attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is discretionary; but it must be supported by
findings and those findings, in turn, must be supported by the record." Partout v. Harper,
145 Idaho 683,689, 183 P.3d 771,777 (2008) (citing Waitv. Leavell Cattle, Inc., 136 Idaho
792, 799, 41 P.3d 220, 227 (2001)). As the District Court analyzed:
The basis for the Ulrich's fee request is Idaho Code§ 12-121 (Idaho
Code§§ 10-1210 and 6-402 provide only for costs). In order for the Ulrichs
to obtain attorney fees from Bach under Idaho Code§ 12-121, this Court must
be left with the abiding belief that the case has been brought or defended
frivolously, unreasonably, or without merit.
The Ulrichs brought this lawsuit to quiet title to an express easement
granted in the deeds of their property in which Bach has an interest.
Throughout this lawsuit, Bach has argued procedural issues which had no basis
in fact. Bach named certain legal claims and defenses, but failed to plead facts
in support thereof. Bach relied upon caselaw that had no bearing upon the
issue at bar. In addition, in his Rule 59 and 60 Motion, Bach attempts to place
irrelevant evidence in the record.
In his Objections to the Ulrichs' Fee Request, Bach argues that the
Ulrichs only prevailed upon their quiet title action, but did not succeed on the
declaratory judgment, preliminary injunction or permanent injunction claims.
To the contrary, in addition to granting quiet title in the Ulrichs, the Summary
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Judgment Order specifically declared the Ulrichs' right, title, claim and
interest in the easement dominant and superior to any right, title, claim or
interest held by Bach in his subservient estate (declaratory judgment); and
permanently enjoined Bach from interfering with the Ulrichs' easement
(permanent injunction). The Ulrichs succeeded in obtaining a preliminary
injunction prior to the Summary Judgment Order.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion inKolouch v. Kramer
is directly on point with regard to an easement owner's right to claim title to
an easement, even if the owner of the servient estate has placed physical
barriers to access by the dominant estate holder. The Court made clear that a
servient estate holder's use of his estate does not become adverse or
inconsistent with the dominant estate holder's right to the easement until the
dominant estate holder's need to use the easement arises. Bach argued that the
Supreme Court's opinion in Kolouch v. Kramer is unconstitutional, but failed
to cite authority in support ofhis bare contention. Bach also failed to show that
Kolouch v. Kramer does not apply to the facts of this case.
(R. Vol. II, p. 267-69) (footnote citations to record omitted). The District Court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding Ulrichs attorney's fees.
Additionally, the amount of attorney's fees and costs awarded by the District Court
was reasonable. (See R. Vol. II., p. 269-71 (District Court's discussion of reasonableness of
costs and fees)). Bach has provided no basis for the overturning ofthe District Court's award
of attorney's fees and costs to Ulrichs in this matter. Therefore, the award of attorney's fees
and costs to Ulrichs should be upheld.

J.

ULRICHS ARE ENTITLED TO AN A WARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
COSTS ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Rules 40 and 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, Ulrichs request their

attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. In support of their request for attorneys' fees on appeal,
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Ulrichs rely on Idaho Code § 12-121. "Idaho Code § 12-121 allows the award of attorney
fees in a civil action if the appeal merely invites the Court to second guess the findings of the
lower court. Attorney fees may also be awarded under section 12-121 'if the appeal was
brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation."' Bach v. Bagley, 148
Idaho 784, 797, 229 P.3d 1146, 1159 (2010) (internal citations omitted).
Just as he did at the District Court level, Bach has raised inapplicable and nonsensical
arguments which have no merit, namely lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, the parol evidence rule and the doctrine of merger. Additionally, Bach has
presented no authority contrary to that of the District Court. Moreover, there is no question
that Kouloch is dispositive in this case. Bach's appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and
without foundation. Therefore, an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121
is appropriate.
Further, Ulrichs request that this Court award cost to Ulrichs pursuant to Rule 40 of
Idaho Appellate Rules.

V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondent respectfully requests this Court find the
following:

(1) that the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment to Ulrichs was proper and should
be upheld;
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(2) that the District Court properly awarded attorney's fees and costs to Ulrichs; and
(3) that Ulrichs are entitled to attorney's fees and costs on appeal against Bach.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

this~'iv;i day of August, 20 2.

Charles A. Homer
Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P.L.L.C.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Respondents
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